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STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY-

The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred
Years Later: Buried, Not Praised**
ABSTRACT

The "HarmonDoctrine"is perhapsthe most notorioustheoryin all
of intentJJtionalnatural re5'Jurceslaw. Based upon an opinion of
Attorney GeneralJudsonHarmonissueda hundredyearsago, the
doctrineholdsthat a countryis abSQlutely
sovereignovertheportion
ofan intentJJtional
watercoursewithin its borders.Thus thatcountry
would be free to divert all of the water from an international
watercourse,leavingnonefordownstreamstates.This articlelooks
closelyat the Harmon Doctrinein historicalcontext.An ex.amination of the condud of the United States during the dispute with
Mexicoover the Rio Grandethat producedthe Doctrine,as well as
othercontemporaneous
and subsequentpractice,demonstratesthat
the United States never actually folluwed the Doctrine in its
practice.It is thereforehighly 1uestionablewhetherthis doctrineis,
or ever was, a part of internationallaw.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law of international watercourses has developed in tandem
with the evolution of human social organization and the intensification
of use by human societies of fresh water. 1 Water is of course essential to
human and other forms of life, but it also fuels industry and facilitates
commerce. In terms of their relative importance to states, however,
navigation held sway over other uses of watercourses until the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. "With the beginning of the
industrial revolution water needs for irrigation, water-power, navigation,
flood control and water supply experienced a sharp increase.'' 2 One
region in which the growth of irrigation agriculture was especially

• Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McCeorge School of L.tw. I would like
to express my appreoation to Jelfrey Carra, UOP McGeorge School of Law class of 1996, for
the excellent assistance he cheerfully provided in connection with the preparation of this
article .
... Portiol\S of this article draw upon a forthcoming book by the author on the Law of
Intemation1l Watercourses.
1. Ste gmtrally LUDWIIC TEcl.AFF
, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY ANO LAW (1967).
2. U.N. 0ep·t of Economic &: Social Affairs, Integrated River &sin ~velopment,
Report of a Panel of ExperlSat 2, U.N. Doc. E/3066/Rev .1 (1970).
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pronounced was the southwestern United States. Irrigated acreage in this
area virtually doubled in the first thirty years of this century. 3 Diversions
for irrigation purposes had already increased sharply during the last
twenty years of the 19th century. 4 As the intensity of non-navigational
uses of international watercourses grew, a body of law dealing with those
uses began to develop. But the development of the law in this area did
not keep ·pace with the intensification of non-navigational uses. Obviously, rules relating to navigation, which were well-developed and broadly
accepted, could not simply be transplanted to the field of
non-navigational uses. 5 States therefore had to rely upon more general
concepts, such as that of territorial sovereignty, to regulate their relations
in this area.
But the fact that the water contained in international watercourses
is in constant motion has made its non-navigational uses particularly
challenging as a subject of international legal regulation. It is axiomatic,
for example, that a state is sovereign within its territory. 6 In this sense,
"sovereignty" implies complete and exclusive authority over that

3. Teclaff, supra note 1 at 83, noting that irrigated land in the western United States
increased from 7,543,000 acres in 1900 to 14,086,000 acres in 1930.
4. A 1896 report indicated that with regard to the Rio Grande alone
an aggregate of 1,074 [diversion] canals taken out in Colorado and New
Mexico prior to 1880 and 1,528 taken from the river and its tributaries at
this date, showing an increase of 454 canals and of 196,000 acres irrigated
in the State of Colorado and Territory of New Mexico .... There are no
reliable records available showing the increase in the preceding years , but
they were doubtless on a more rapidly increasing ratio .
Report of the International water Boundary Commission of Nov. 25, 1896, annexed to letter
of 25 Nov. 1896 from Col. Anson Mills, Commissioner, to the Secretary of State, reprinted
in The Rio Grande Claim (U.S. v. Gt. Brit.), Am. & Brit. Claims Arb. 1910, Pleadings &
Awards, vol. 22, Claim No. 83 (1923), Appendix to the Answer of the United States, 261,265
(1923) [hereinafter U.S. Appendix].
5. To this effect, see Georges Sauser-Hall, L'Utilisation Industriel/e des Fleuves
Internationaux, 83 REc. DESCOURS465, 475, (1953-11)(referring to Charles Rousseau .) It may
be, however, that certain principlesare applicable to both kinds of uses. In particular, the
reference of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the River Order case to a
"community of interest of riparian States ... in a navigable river," 1929 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A, No .
16), at 27, has been applied by commentators to problems involving non-navigational uses,
even though the case itself involved navigation . See, e.g., Lucius Caflisch, Reg/esGbiera/esdu
Droit des Cours d'Eau lnternationaux, 219 REC. DES COURS (1989-VII) 9, 60 (1992); JOHAN
LAMMERS,
POLLUTION
OFINTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES
507 (1984);JEROME
LIPPER,Equitable
Utilization, in THE LAWOFlNTERNATIONAL
DRAINAGE
BASINS15, 29 (Albert H. Garretson, et
Cal , eds., 1967).
6. "[T)he jurisdiction of the state over its terr itory is called territorial sovereignty."
Milan Sahovif & William Bishop, The Authority of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons
and Places,in MANUALOF l'UBUC lNTERNATIONAL
LAW,311, 314 (Max Serensen, ed., 1968).
"lT)he jurisdiction of a state over its territory is the basis of its activity .... " Id. at 313.
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territory.7 However, does it necessarily follow that international law
imposes no constraints upon a state's use within its territory of a river
that flows into another state? Does a downstream state have no right to
object to uses of a watercourse in an upstream state that result in harm
to the former? 8 And what of the sovereignty of the downstream state
over its territory? Is it proper to regard that as having been infringed if
actions in the upstream state unfavorably alter the characteristics of the
portion of the watercourse in the downstream state?
These questions attracted the interest of scholars beginning early
in the nineteenth century. 9 Theories ranged from one extreme to the
other. At one end of the continuum was the doctrine of "absolute
territorial sovereignty," according to which a state could do virtually as
it pleased with the portion of an international watercourse within its
territory-at least short of changing its course so it entered the downstream state at a different location-irrespective of the harmful consequences in the downstream state. At the other extreme was the doctrine
of "a.bsolute territorial integrity," which held that the upstream state
could do nothing to interfere with the natural flow of the river into the
downstream state .10 While it seems obvious that neither of these extreme
theories is suited to today's interdependent world, each was asserted at
early stages of the development of the law in this field. Even today there
are instances, albeit isolated and infrequent ones, in which states have
taken positions that bear a striking similarity to these doctrines .11
The doctrine of "absolute territorial sovereignty" is most often
identified with an opinion prepared in 1895 by an Attorney General of
the United States, Judson Harmon, in response to a request by the
Department of State for advice concerning a dispute with Mexico over the
use of waters of the Rio Grande . This opinion has become so synonymous with the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty that it now
stands as the doctrine's cornerstone, if not its entire foundation. The
centennial of the "Harmon Doctrine" invites a close examination of this
theory with a view to determining its international legal status. This
article will undertake only a portion of such an examination, focusing

7. Id. at 316.
8. A negative answer to this question is suggested by Sahovit & Bishop: "[T]he
territorial sovereignty of a state must not be exercised in a manner detrimental to other
states but in good faith in compliance with international obligations and with international
law in general." Supra note 6, at 316 (citing the Corfu Channelcase, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 22).
9. Seegenerallythe surveys of scholarly opinion in F. BERBER,
RIVERS
IN lNTERNATIONAL
LAW 11-40 (1959) (surveying scholarly opinion).
10. These and other theories are discussed in Berber, supra note 9; and Lipper, supra
note 5, at 16-40.
11. See, e.g., Lipper, supra note 5, at 18-22; and Caflisch, supra note 5, at 16-40 (both
surveying state practice).
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upon the historical context in which the doctrine was articulated and its
observance, or lack thereof, in subsequent United States practice . The
dispute that formed the crucible of the doctrine serves as a valuable case
study because it shows that a position formally taken by a state in a
particular diplomatic exchange may reflect advocacy more than a
detached view of the law, and thus may be a position the state would not
be willing to abide by if its situation in that or a similar controversy were
reversed. The article will conclude that if the United States ever embraced
the doctrine, except as a matter of advocacy in a particular dispute, it has
long since ceased to do so.
II.

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED
STA TES OVER UTILIZATION OF THE RIO GRANDE

A. Introduction: The Rio Grande
While no doubt an important river for the arid regions of
southwestern United States and northeastern Mexico, the Rio Grande is
not among the world 's largest rivers, in terms of either length or runoff.
The river rises in the United States and flows some 1,885 miles, 12 1,240
of which form the border between the United States and Mexico, before
emptying into the Gulf of Mexico. This qualifies the Rio Grande as the
fifth longest river in North America .13 While estimates of its average
runoff vary from 82 to 120 cubic meters per second, 14 only a fraction of
that of the Colorado, 15 all studies agree that the river places at or near
the bottom of the list of significant international watercourses in this
category . From its source in the San Juan Mountains of southwestern
Colorado, the Rio Grande flows for some 645 miles through Colorado
and New Mexico before becoming the boundary between the United

12. 24 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
, 1023 (1987). Like nearly all data , estimates of the
length of rivers vary considerably. Thus the length of the Rio Grande has been placed at
distances ranging from 2,870 to 3,034 kilometers . WATERIN CRISIS153 (Peter H. Gleick, ed,
1993).
13. 24 ENCYCWPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
supra note 12, at 1023.
14. Water In Crisis, supra note 12, at 146, 147. This volume presents data from different
sources on this and other questions . The 82 figure is from a 1981 study by E. Czaya , while
that of 120 is from one of 1982 by K. S:z.estay. Id. at 145. A third study, by M. Meybeck
(1988), places the Rio Grande's runoff at 100 cubic meters per second-again the lowest
quantity on the list of, in the case of that study, 47 rivers . Id.
15. The same studies place the runoff of the Colorado at quantities vary ing from 580
(Szestay) to 640 (Meybeck) cubic meters per second . WATERIN CRlslS, supra note 12, at 147,
148. However , Cz.aya estimates that river's flow at the U.S.-Mexico border to be a mere 168
cubic meters per second . Id., at 146.
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States and Mexico.1'
B. The Events Leading Up To the Issuance of Hannon's Opinio11c

A controversy arose in the latter part of the 19th century over
diversions of water from the Rio Grande in the United States. 17 In
October, 1894, the Mexican Minister at Washington, Matias Romero, sent
a note to American Secretary of State W.Q. Gresham transmitting a copy
of a communication to Romero from the consul of Mexico at El Paso.
Romero emphasized that the communication
shows the urgent necessity that exists for a decision of the
question relative to the taking of water from the Rio Bravo
(Rio Grande) del Norte in the State of Colorado and the Territory of New Mexico, which has so seriously affected the existence of the frontier communities for several miles below Paso
del Norte [Ciudad Juarez 18] • • • and points out the danger
lest otherwise those communities may be annihilated. 19
The communication of the Mexican consul provides insight into the
seriousness of the situation . The consul, Jose Zayas Guarneros, believed
that the disposition of this question would decide "the existence or the
disappearance of the frontier towns" of both Ciudad Juarez and El Paso,
Texas. His letter gives a grim account of the economic straits of Ciudad
Juarez and states that "[t]here remains no other recourse for the
maintenance of tranquillity pending the settlement of the main question
. .. than the equitable division of the waters of the river.'' 20 Minister
Romero closed his note to the American Secretary of State by soliciting
"an examination and decision of this grave question" by the State
Department. 21

16. Specifically, the river forms the boundary between the U.S. State of Texas and the
Mexican States of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Le6n, and Tamaulipas .
17. For a description of the problems of this period between the United States and
Mexico relating to international rivers, see James Simsarian, The Diversionof WatersAffecting
the UnitedStatesand Mexico, 17 TEx. L. REV.27 (1939). See also Jacob Austin, Canadian-United
StatesPracticeand TheoryRespectingthe InternationalLaw of InternationalRivers:A Study of the
History and Influenceof the Harmon Doctrine,37 CAN. BARREV. 393, 405-411 (1959) .
18. Ciudad Juarez is a Mexican community directly across the river from El Paso,
Texas.
19. Letter from Minister Romero to Secretary Gresham (12 Oct. 1894), reprinted in
FoREIGNRELATIONS
OFTHE UNITEDSTATES,
395 (1894) . Seealso 1 Moore DIGEST
OF UNITED
STATES
PRACTICEIN INTERN
ATIONALLAW (hereinafter DIGEST)at 764.
20. Letter from Mr. Guameros to Mr. Romero (4 Oct. 1894), reprinted in FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE UNITEDSTATES,
395-96 (1894) .
21. Id. at 395 .
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The Secretary of State responded just over two weeks later. 22 He
informed the Mexican Minister that he had referred the latter's earlier
note of September 10 concerning the same question to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. He further informed the Minister that the Department of Agriculture was of the opinion that "it is by no means certain
that the low state of the Rio Grande at Ciudad Juarez and vicinity is due
to the utilization of water for irrigation along the upper course of the
river to a greater extent than heretofore ." 23 Secretary Gresham went on
to observe that Ciudad Juarez had frequently experienced failures of
water supply in the past, and opined that the current problem "is
satisfactorily explained by the drought that has prevailed over the
headwaters of the Rio Grande for the last two or three years, and over
the territory around El Paso for six or eight years." 24 He then stated that
"[t]he evidence in the possession of the Department of Agriculture does
not show any material increase in the utilization of water for irrigation
on the Upper Rio Grande for several years past." 25 Finally, Secretary
Gresham informed Minister Romero that his note of October 12 had also
been referred to the Secretary of Agriculture. 26
Thus, far from being a legalistic denial of any obligation to
provide water to Mexico, the initial response of the U.S. Government to
the Mexican complaint was a purely factual one. Furthermore, while
Secretary Gresham did not give Minister Romero the kind of response the
latter doubtless would have liked, neither did he in any way close the
door to further discussions of the problem. A cooperative attitude is also
reflected in the message to Congress delivered by President Cleveland in
December of the same year, in which the President stated : ''The problem
of the storage and use of the waters of the Rio Grande for irrigation
should be solved by appropriate concurrent action of the two interested
countries." 27
The shortages of Rio Grande water experienced by Mexican
communities in the vicinity of Ciudad Juarez had been called to the
attention of the Department of War earlier, in an 1890 report from the
U.S. Army officer in charge of the Department of Texas. The report
described the alarm of the Mexicans along the Rio Grande at what they
considered a violation of their riparian rights by American withdrawals

22. Letter from Secretary Gresham to Minister Romero (Nov. 1, 1894), printed in

FOREIGN
RELATIO
NS, supranote 20 at 397.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
27. President Grover Cleveland, Annual Message , Dec. 3, 1894, 1 Moore
note 19, at 764.
23.
24.
25.
26.

DIGEST ,

supra
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of water to irrigate the San Luis valley in Colorado, which was said to
have left the Rio Grande a dry bed for 500 miles.28
Evidencing a broad recognition of the seriousness of the situation
even as early as 1890, the U.S. Congress in that year passed a concurrent
resolution concerning the problem .29 In its second preambular paragraph
the resolution specifically acknowledged that upstream diversions from
the Rio Grande were depriving those in the Juarez-El Paso area of water:
by means of irrigating ditches and canals taking the water
from said river and other causes, the usual supply of water
therefrom has been exhausted before it reaches the point
where it divides the United States of America from the
Republic of Mexico, thereby rendering the lands in its valley
arid and unproductive, to the great detriment of the citizens
of the two countries who live along its course .. . .30
The resolution described these and other conditions 31 as a "standing
menace to the harmony and prosperity of the citizens of said countries,
and the amicable and orderly administration of their respective Governments . ... " 32 The two houses of Congress therefore resolved that the
President be requested to enter into negotiations with Mexico with a view
to resolving, inter alia, the Rio Grande water problems .
Mexico having received no satisfaction from the United States in
response to its note of October, 1894, Minister Romero sent another note
concerning the problem to the State Department dated October 21,
1895.11 In this communication Romero carefully described the arid
condition of the Ciudad Juarez region, demonstrating the dependence of
farmers there on Rio Grande water for irrigation of their crops. 34 He
stated that during the nearly 300-year existence of Ciudad Juarez, its
inhabitants had irrigated their land with water from the Rio Grande.

:28. Report of General Stanley to Secretary of War, Sept. 12 1889, quotedin "Irrigation
of Arid Lands-International Boundary-Mexican Relations, " H.R. Rep. No. 490, 51st Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1890).
29. Concurrent Resolution of 29 Apr . 1890 "concerning the irrigation of arid lands in
the valley of the Rio Grande River, the construction of a dam across said river at or near El
Paso, Tex., for the storage of its waste waters, and for other purposes ," Slst.Cong., 1st Sess.,
21 CONG. REC. 3963, 3977 (1890); U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 145. This resolution is
referred to in the opinion of Attorney General Judson Harmon , 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1895).
30. Concurrent Resolution of 29 Apr . 1890, supra note 29 at 3977.
31. The other conditions referred to were changes in cou rse of the river due to flooding
resulting in confusion as to the location of the boundary.
32. Concurrent Resolution of Apr. 29, 1890, supra note 29 at 3977.31.
33. Letter from Matras Romero, Mexican Mini ster, to Richard Olney , Secretary of State
(Oct. 21, 1895), reprintedin U.S. Appendix,supra note 4, at 200, 202.
34. "[T)otal rainfall from August 15, 1893, to August 14, 1894, was 4.97 inches, or next
to nothing at all." Id. at 200-01.
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According to Romero, the city and districts within its jurisdiction did not
need more than 20 cubic meters of water per second for their crops,
which he described as "an almost infinitesimal portion of the amount of
water which flowed down the river, even in times of severest
drought .. . ."35 He stated that they therefore "had sufficient water for
their crops until about 10 years ago [i.e., 1885), when a great many
trenches were dug in the State of Colorado (especially in the St. Louis
[San Luis) Valley), and in the Territory of New Mexico, through which
the Rio Grande and its affluents flow." 36 Romero charged that because
of these diversions the river's flow at El Paso had been diminished to
such an extent that there was a scarcity of water from mid-June until
March, "which is the very time when water is most needed for the
crops ." 37 He stated that in 1894 "the river became dried up entirely by
the 15th of June," and that "[i)n that year the farmers were unable to
raise any Indian com, vegetables, or grapes, and the scarcity of water was
such that even the fruit trees began to wither." 38 According to Minister
Romero, this situation had led to a decrease in land values and a
reduction of the population in the communities in the vicinity of Ciudad
Juarez from 20,000 in 1875 to 10,000 in 1894.39
Romero drew attention to the 1890 joint resolution of Congress
calling upon the President to enter into negotiations with Mexico
concerning the problem but stated that despite his efforts on behalf of the
government of Mexico, it had not been possible "to make much progress
in this matter." 40 Romero then outlined the legal position of Mexico.
First, Mexico contended that the American diversions violated Article VII
of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which provides in part: "the
navigation of the [Rio Grande) below [the southern boundary of New
Mexico) shall be free and common to the vessels and citizens of both
countries; and neither shall, without the consent of the other , construct
any work that may impede or interrupt, in whole or in part, the exercise
of this right . ... " 41 Romero referred to an 1850 U.S. Army report
indicating that an Army officer had traveled up the Rio Grande "with a
vessel, reaching a point several kilometers above [El Paso), which shows
that it was navigable at that time." 42 According to Mexico, the irrigation
ditches in Colorado and New Mexico fell within the treaty 's prohibition
35. Id. at 201.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 202.
41. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo , Feb. 2,1848, U.S.-Mex., at Art . VII, reprinted in 1
Malloy DIGEST
at 1107,1111.
42. Id.
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were supported by principles of international law independent of any
treaty obligation."
The Attorney General's response addressed both of these
questions. 49 As to the treaty, Harmon's view was that Article VII applied
only to '"the part of the Rio Bravo del Norte [Rio Grande] lying below
the southern boundary of New Mexico,"' 50 and "[i]t is that part alone
which is made free and common to the navigation of both countries, and
to which the various prohibitions apply." 51 Thus Harmon interpreted
Article VII to mean that any activities taking place north of the southern
boundary of New Mexico-Le., the point at which the Rio Grande
becomes a contiguous watercourse-were outside the scope of the article,
and therefore the treaty. 52 This construction is by no means dictated by
the terms of the article, and in fact seems strained by today's standards.
The article merely provides that there shall be freedom of navigation for
both countries on the Rio Grande below the New Mexico border, and that
neither country is to construct any work that may interfere with this right

48. Id.

49. Letter to Judson Harmon, Attorney General, from Richard Olney, Secretary of State
(Dec. 12, 1895), printed in U.S. A~dix,
supra note 4, at 204. The Secretary of State's letter
does not actually ask whether Art. VII of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo would
provide a basis for Mexico's claims, only whether it was still in force as far as the Rio
Grande was concerned (Harmon concluded it was) . Nevertheless, the Attorney General
responded to each of Mexico's legal claims, i.e., that the American diversions violated either
the treaty or principles of international law independent of any special treaty or convention.
Id.

50. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 277. Harmon quoted from Article VII of the treaty. He also
noted that Article IV of the Gadsden treaty of Dec. 30, 1853 continued Article VII of the 1848
treaty in force only as to the Rio Grande below the point at which it became the boundary
between the United States and Mexico as provided in the 1853 treaty. Gadsden Treaty, Dec.
30, 1853, U.S.-Mex., at Article IV, Represinted in 1 MALLOYDigest 1121, 1123. However,
Article IV was motivated not by a wish to ensure freedom to divert unlimited quantities of
water from the Rio Grande north of the boundary, but by the fact that "[t)he provisions of
the 6th and 7th articles of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo [were) rendered nugatory for
the most part by the cession of territory granted in the first article of this [i.e., the 1953)
treaty .... " Id. Thus the portions of Article VII of the 1948 treaty that were "rendered
nugatory" were those concerning the boundary in and freedom of navigation on the river
Gila, which before the Gadsden Purchase constituted the boundary but after the Purchase
lay entirely within the United States (now the State of Arizona) . Understandably , Harmon
does not pursue this point further .
51. 21 Op. Att'y Gen . 274, 277 (1895).
52. In fact, Harmon seemed to go even farther, arguing that the prohibition against
works that might interfere with navigation applied only up to the "head of navigation" i.e.,
as far up the river as vessels could navigate. At one point the Attorney General claimed this
was some 150 miles downstream of El Paso (rather than several kilometers upstream of El
Paso as alleged by the Mexican Minister). 21 Op. Atty ' y Gen. 274, 276 (1895). At another
point, however, he states, "[a)bove the head of navigation ... the river would be wholly
within the United States." Id.
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without the other's consent. It does not say that neither country shall
construct any work on that stretchof the riverthat may impede navigation.
The notion that water could be withdrawn just above the southern border
of New Mexico in sufficient quantities to make navigation impossible
below the U.S.-Mexico border, and that this would not be contrary to
both the letter and the spirit of Article VII, seems absurd on its face.53
Such an interpretation is also inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness.54
In support of his interpretation, Harmon referred to the fact that
Article VII prohibits the two countries from constructing any of the
specified works. ''The prohibition was ... made applicable to them alone,
and not to the citizens of either . . . ."55 The explanation for this, in
Harmon's view, is that such works could have been constructed on the
navigable portions of the river only by one of the two countries, or under
its authority, and not by its citizens. Conversely, in Harmon's view:
Above the head of navigation, where the river would be
wholly within the United States, different rules would apply
and private rights exist which the Government could not
control or take away save by the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, so that clear and explicit language would be
required to impose upon the United States such obligations as
would result from the construction of the treaty now suggested [by Mexico).56
Thus Harmon seems to be saying that unless a provision is addressed in
terms to the "citizens" of a country, it applies only to governments. But
according to Harmon, a government would apparently be powerless to
stop private citizens from diverting even all of the water of the Rio
Grande, unless compensation were paid. This seems to follow from his
statement that "private rights exist which the Government could not
control or take away save by the exercise of the power of eminent

53. In Austin's view, "whatever merit [Harmon's] argument may have as an exercise
in logic it has no relation to common sense .. . . What this article in fact says is that
Mexicans have the right to navigate up to the boundary and nothing shall interfere with this
right. Any other construction would reduce the clause to nonsense .... Attorney General
Harmon in this case is guilty of serious error ." Austin, supra note 17, at 407.
54. "When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does
not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purpose of
the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted ." Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth Session,(1966] 2 Y.B. lnt'I L.
Comm'n 219, U .N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/ Add.1. The principle of effectiveness is
expressed in the maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. SeegenerallyIAN SINCLAIR,
TuE
VIENNA CONVENTION
ON 1HE LAW OFTREATIES,118 (2d ed. 1984).
55. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 277 (1895).
56. Id. at 277-78.
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domain .... " While he does not explain this statement, it seems to be
based upon a belief that the federal government has no authority to
regulate private activities affecting international watercourses unless those
activities involve navigation. He apparently assumes the diversions in
Colorado and New Mexico do not involve navigation because (a) the Rio
Grande is non-navigable in those stretches, and (b) the activities involved
are non-navigational uses. It appears that in Harmon's view, such a
"regulation" would in fact be an exercise of the power of eminent
domain-a "taking" of property, which would have to be accompanied
by the payment of compensation.
This line of reasoning calls for two comments. First, the notion
that the conduct of a state's citizens would not be covered by a treaty
provision unless it expressly required the state to regulate that conduct
reflects a lack of understanding of international law. A treaty providing
that "neither country shall construct any work that may impede the
exercise of the right of navigation" would obligate each party to ensure
that not only its government agencies but also its citizens refrained from
the acts in question . If the municipal law of one or both of the parties
required that some special measures be taken in order to implement the
treaty obligation (such as payment of compensation under United States
law), that would not affect the obligation itself.
Second, the idea that the United States government had no
authority over activities of private citizens affecting the Rio Grande above
the U.S.-Mexico border was challenged by the U.S. government itself
shortly after Harmon delivered his opinion. Following continued Mexican
complaints, in particular concerning the plan of the Rio Grande Dam and
Irrigation Company, and the affiliated Rio Grande Irrigation & Land Co.
(Ltd.), to construct dams and other works on the Rio Grande at Elephant
Butte, New Mexico, the Secretary of State wrote the Secretary of the
Interior requesting that any additional rights to build dams be denied, at
least "until the negotiations now pending between Mexico and the United
States have reached a final conclusion." 57 He further suggested an
investigation of "the rights already granted to the Rio Grande Irrigation
& Land Co. (Ltd.) ... with a view to ascertaining whether there is any
legal power to cancel those rights .... " 58 It later came to the attention
of the Secretary of State that "the Rio Grande River in some parts above
the international boundary line is, and has been used as, a waterway for
navigation between the United States and Mexico . .. ."9J The Secretary

57. Letter from Secretary Olney to David Francis, Secretary of the Interior (30 Nov.
1896), reprintedin U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 272, 274.
58. Id.
59. Letter from Secretary Olney to D. Francis, Secretary of the Interior (Jan. 11, 1897),
reprintedin U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 292, 293.
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of State therefore inquired of the Secretary of War, who had jurisdiction
over the protection of navigable waters, whether a permit would not be
required from the War Department for this work on the ground that the
section of the Rio Grande in question was navigable within the meaning
of the relevant U.S. statutes. 60 Thereafter, in May, 1897, none other than
the Attorney General (Harmon had by this time been succeeded by
Joseph McKenna) brought an action against the private companies,
alleging, among other things, that: the object of the latter was "to obtain
control of the entire flow of the ... Rio Grande" by constructing dams that
would "create the largest artificial lake in the world"; the dry air in the
region causes water to evaporate so rapidly that ''but little water, after it
is distributed over the surface of the earth, would be returned to the
river''; the river was navigable "from El Paso to La Joya, about one
hundred miles above Elephant Butte"; and "the impounding of the
waters ... at ... Elephant Butte will so deplete and prevent the flow of
water through the channel of said river below said dam . . . as to
seriously obstruct the navigable capacity of the said river throughout its
entire course from said point at Elephant Butte to its mouth." 61 The
United States then "set forth the treaty stipulations between the United
States and the Republic of Mexico in reference to the navigability of the
Rio Grande . . .. " 62 In other words, the Attorney General made the very
argument that his predecessor, Judson Harmon, had rejected two years
earlier when it had been made by Mexico.
The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the Rio
Grande was not navigable within the limits of New Mexico and that the
United States therefore lacked jurisdiction over the proposed project. The
government appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which in 1899
reversed the judgment of the court below. 63 The Court found it unnecessary to consider the obligations of the United States under treaties and
international law. Its obligation to preserve the navigability of navigable
waters for its own citizens, said the Court, "is certainly as great as any
arising by treaty or international law to other nations or their citizens,
and if the proposed dam and appropriation of the waters of the Rio
Grande constitute a breach of treaty obligations or of international duty
60. Letter from Secretary of State Richard Olney to Daniel Lamont, Secretary of War
Oan. 13,1897) , reprinted in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 295, 297 . Olney had earlier
recognized that Harmon's opinion had "held that the river was not navigable above the
bound ary in the sense of the treaty between the United states and Mexico, but the question
here is whether it is navigable within the meaning of the laws of the United States." Letter
from Secretary Olney to the Secretary of the Interior (Jan. 11, 1897), printed in U.S. Appn,dix,
supra note 4, at 292, 293 .
61. United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co ., 174 U.S. 690, 691-92 (1899) .
62. Id. at 692.
63. Id.

738

NATURAL RESOURCESJOURNAL

(Vol. 36

to Mexico, they also constitute an equal injury and wrong to the people
of the United States." 64 Since there had been no trial on the issue, the
Court assumed for purposes of the appeal that the defendants' appropriation of water would "seriously affect the navigability of the river where
it is now navigable. The right to do this is claimed by defendants and
denied by the Government . . . ." 65 Thus the United States government
(per the Attorney General) claimed authority in this case that Harmon
had denied it possessed in the opinion he had earlier prepared for the
Secretary of State.
As Harmon had argued in that opinion, the defendants contended that the jurisdiction of the government under the applicable statute
was limited to obstructions in the navigable portions of a navigable
stream, and that the statute did not apply to the Rio Grande in New
Mexico since it was not navigable. 66 But the Court rejected this reasoning, stating that statute extended to "anything, wherever done or
however done, within the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States
which tends to destroy the navigable capacity of one of the navigable
waters of the United States . ... " 67 The Court ruled that whether the act
sought to be enjoined would actually diminish the navigable capacity of
a stream was a question of fact. It therefore remanded the case to the
lower court to determine whether the defendants' project on the Rio
Grande would "substantially diminish the navigability of that stream
within the limits of present navigability, and if so, to enter a decree
restraining those acts to the extent that they will so diminish." 68
The case would go back to the U.S. Supreme Court on two
additional occasions. But after the first Supreme Court decision the
United States is reported to have offered not to continue to pursue the
proceedings 69 if defendant companies would: "Recognize the prior right
of the people of the valley at El Paso, Mexican as well as American, to a
prior use of the waters of the Rio Grande ... ."ro The notion that Mexico

64. Id. at 701.
65. Id. at 702.
66. Id. at 708.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 710.
69. The British memorial states that the U.S. government offered "not to appeal from
the trial court's dismissal of the said injunction." The Rio Grande Claim, (U.S. v. Gr . Brit.).
Am . &: Brit Claims Arb. 1910,Pleadings and Awards, vol. 22, Claim No . 83 (1923),Memorial
of Great Britain 15 (hereafter British Memorial). But at the stage at which the offer was
made, the case was on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of
New Mexico had issued a mandate to the trial court to set aside the decree of dismissal and
proceed in accordance with the mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court. U.S. Appendix, supra
note 4, at 43-44.
70. BritishMemorial,supra note 69, at 15.
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has a "prior right" to Rio Grande waters, which was evidently embraced
by the Justice Department, 71 reflects a complete reversal of position from
that stated in Attorney General Harmon's opinion. The subsequent
proceedings resulted ultimately in an order permanently enjoining the
defendant companies from constructing a dam at Elephant Butte.72 But
the point of present interest is that the United States Supreme Court, in
holding that the courts could restrain, at the instance of the federal
government, any acts in New Mexico by private parties that could
diminish the navigability of the navigable portions of the Rio Grande
below El Paso, reached a result that was identical to that argued for by
Minister Romero in his protest of October, 1895, and rejected at the time
by Attorney General Harmon. While it did so on the basis of the
obligations of the United States government under domestic law, there
is nothing in the opinion that suggests the conclusion would have been
different under applicable treaties or rules of international law. Indeed,
in a dramatic reversal, the Attorney General argued in the case that the
Elephant Butte project would put the United States in violation of its
obligations under international law. 73
The portion of the Attorney General's 1895 opinion dealing with
general principles of international law embodies passages that have since
become known as the "Harmon Doctrine". These passages will be set
forth below, but their essential message is that the United States is under
no obligation to Mexico to restrain its use of the Rio Grande because its
absolute sovereignty within its own territory entitles it to dispose of the
water within that territory in any way it wishes, regardless of the
consequences in Mexico. Harmon begins his discussion by stating: "An
extended search affords no precedent or authority which has direct
bearing ." 74 It is true, as we have seen, that most of the law that had
developed by the time Harmon wrote his opinion dealt with navigation.
But in fact, there were by 1895 a number of authorities that addressed the
question before Harmon and upon which he could have drawn, but did
not. Some support the view of absolute sovereignty he espoused, 75 but
others recognize rights in the lower riparian country. 76 The only

71. The settlement offer was made by Marsden C. Burch, Special Counsel of the
Department of Justice , under instruction of the Attorney-General, John W . Griggs . British
Memorial, supra note 69, at 15.
n . United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co ., 184 U.S. 416 (1902); Rio
Grande Dam and Irrigation Co. v. United States, 215 U.S. 266 (1909).
73. United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. at 700 (1899).
74. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. at 280.
75. See, e.g., KLUBER,1 EUROPAISCHES
V6LKERRECHT
, 128 (1821); AUGUSTHEFFTER,DAS
EUROPAISCHEV6LKERREOITDER GEGENWART,150 (1888). These authorities are discussed by
Berber supra note 9, at 15-16.
76. See II HUGO GROTIUS,DE }URIBELLIAC PACIS,Lib. II, Cap. II, XII; the Decree of the
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authorities Harmon cites that deal specifically with international
watercourses address solely the theory of international servitudes.
Harmon states that some authors believe a lower riparian country (the
"servient" country) has an obligation to receive water from an upper
riparian (the "dominant" country) because of a natural international
servitude. But he also accepts that "[t]he dominant country may not
divert the course of the stream so as to throw it upon 'the territory of the
other at a different place ." 77 This seems to be at least an implicit
acceptance of the obligation not to cause harm to another riparian
state .78 Harmon distinguishes this situation from one in which the flow
to the lower riparian country is reduced, which he characterizes as "a
diminution of the servitude." 79 Perhaps unwittingly, Harmon thereby
demonstrates the weakness of the servitude analogy in this context since
his reasoning suggests that the lower riparian should actually welcomea
reduction in flow . He nevertheless goes on to reason as follows: "[I]t is
evident that what is really contended for is a servitude which makes the
lower country dominant and subjects the upper country to the burden of
arresting its development and denying to its inhabitants the use of a
provision which nature has supplied entirely within its own territory." 80
Yet he finds that no writer with whoil'\ he is familiar would draw such
a consequence from the doctrine of international servitude. In fact, de
Martens , writing in 1883, did just that :
Dans le domaine des relations internationales la souverainete
territoriale se trouve deja limitee par le fait de la coexistence
et de }'association des Etats. La nature meme de leurs relations
de voisinage ne leur permet pas de disposer de leur territoire
sans aucune restriction. De la son nees les servitudes
intemationales naturelles auxquelles sont soumis tout les Etats
par suite des conditions inJvitables de leur existence physique

Provisory Executive Council of the French Republic of Nov . 16, 1792, cited in 2 P.
PRADIER-FODliRt2 TRAITEDE DROITINI'ERNATIONAL
PUBLICEURO~EN ET AMliRICAIN,(1885);
CARATHEOOORY,
DU DROJTINTERNATIONAL
CONCERNANT
LESGRANDSCOURSD'EAU, 32 (1861).
These authorities are discussed in Berber, supra note 9, at 22-23, 26. The first edition of
Oppenheim 's classic work INTERNATIONAL
LAW was published severill years after Hannon
conducted his research, but also recognized that a state has an obligation not to "alter the
natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions of a
territory of a neighbouring state-for instance, to stop or to divert the flow of a river which
runs from its own into a neighbouring territory. " 1 LASSAOPPENHEIM,INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
175 (1st ed . 1905).
77. 21 Op . Att'y Gen . 274, 280.
78. Id. He also accepts that "(t]he servient country may not obstruct the stream so as
to cause the water to back up and overflow the territories of the other ." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 281.
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a cot~ des autres. 81

But the work of this great figure in the field of international law
evidently did not come to the attention of the Attorney General. It must
be concluded that the servitude theory, especially as characterized by
Harmon, seems almost entirely inapposite to the case at hand. 82 Its
principal utility in the context of the opinion seems to be as a straw man:
an argument that is set up because it is easy to knock down.
Having found no authority specifically on point, Harmon turned
to general principles of international law. He stated the doctrine that
bears his name in the following words:
The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute
sovereignty of every nation, as against all others, within its
own territory. Of the nature and scope of sovereignty with
respect to judicial jurisdiction , which is one of its elements,
Chief Justice Marshall said (SchoonerExchangev. McFadden,7
Cranch [U.S. Supreme Court Reports) p. [116, at) 136 [(1812))):
'The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validly from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction,
and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in
that power which could impose such restriction.
'All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a
nation within its own territories must be traced up to the
consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other

81. ("In the domain of international relations, territorial sovereignty is limited by the
fact of the coexistence and the society of states . The very nature of their neighborhood
relations does not permit them to dispose of their territory without any restriction. From this
are born international natural servitudes, to which all states are subject in consequence of
the inevitable conditions of their physical existence, one beside the other .-"Author's
translat ion) F. DE MARTENS, TRAIT~ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 479 (1883) (translated from
Russian). SeealsoJuraj Andrassy, Les RelationsInternationales
de Voisinage,79 REcUEJL DES
COURS77, at 103 (1952).
82. This conclusion is reinforced by Oppenheim in his first edition, published ten years
after Harmon rendered his opinion . This renowned work states : "State servitudes are those
exceptional and conventional restrictions on the territorial supremacy of a State(.) . . .
Servitudes must not be confounded with those general restrictions upon territorial
supremacy which, according to certain rules of the Law of Nations, concern all States alike."
Oppenheim, supra note 76, at 257-58 (footnotes omitted) . As an example of such a general
restriction upon territorial supremacy Oppenheim gives a state' s obligation "to admit the
free passage of foreign merchantmen through its territorial maritime belt." Id. at 258. This
is one of the examples cited by the author earlier in the work , in the section on territorial
supremacy. Another example given in that section, as noted elsewhere, is a state's obligation
not "to stop or divert the flow of a river which runs from its own into neighbouring
territory ." Id. at 175.
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legitimate source. ' 83
What is known as the ''Harmon Doctrine" thus consists of a few
rather short paragraphs in an opinion of some nine pages. And those
paragraphs consist chiefly of a quotation from an opinion of the Supreme
Court in a sovereign immunity case decided over eighty years earlier .
Harmon did attempt to bolster this brief discussion by invoking the idea
of self-preservation along with a further reference to servitudes:
[S)elf-preservation is one of the first laws of nations. No
believer in the doctrine of natural servitudes has ever suggested one which would interfere with the enjoyment by a nation
within its own territory of whatever was necessary to the
development of its resources or the comfort of its people. 84
Harmon does not explain how this case, involving elective
diversions that enriched developers, fits within the idea of
self-preservation. No doubt, the doctrine of self-preservation itself was
recognized by commentators at the turn of the century. 85 But, as
Oppenheim pointed out as early as 1905, self-preservation was not a
right, but an excuse:
If every State really had a right of self-preservation, all the
States would have the duty to admit, suffer, and endure every
violation done to one another in self-preservation. But such
duty does not exist. On the contrary, although self-preservation is in certain cases an excuse recognized by International
Law, no State is obliged patiently to submit to violations done
to it by such other State as acts in self-preservation, but can
repulse them. It is a fact that in certain cases violations
committed in self-preservation are not prohibited by the Law
of Nations. But they remain violations and can therefore be
repulsed. Self-preservation is consequently an excuse .... 86

Oppenheim went on to state that it had become increasingly recognized
that
violations of other states in the interest of self-preservation are
excused in cases of necessityonly. Such acts of violence in the
interest of self-preservation are exclusively excused as are
necessary in self-defence, because otherwise the acting State
would have to suffer or have to continue to suffer a violation
against itself.87

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

21 Op . Att'y Gen . at 281-82.
ld. at 282.
See Oppenheim's, supra note 76, at 177-81.
ld. at 178.
ld. (emphasis in original) .
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In other words, unless they are "necessary" to prevent "an imminent
violation or the continuation of an already commenced violation," acts
contrary to international law cannot be justified under the doctrine of
self-preservation .
There are thus a number of problems with Harmon 's use of
self-preservation . First, there was no question of self-defense against any
act by Mexico in violation of its obligations toward the United States,
imminent or otherwise. Thus, the acts of the United States could not have
been "necessary'' in self-defense against a violation by Mexico. Second,
the invocation of self-preservation in effect admits that the United States'
diversions of Rio Grande waters were unlawful; self-preservation would
operate, in effect, as an excuse. And third, even though the United States'
violations might be excused as acts of self-preservation, there would be
no requirement that those acts "patiently be suffered and endured by''
Mexico. At the very least, Mexico would have a right to reparation for
injuries caused. Finally, it should be noted that all of the examples of acts
of self-preservation cited by Oppenheim 88 involve uses of force in the
face of grave and imminent danger, demonstrating how inapposite the
doctrine is to the facts of the Rio Grande case.
The closest contemporary analogy to the idea of self-preservation
is probably the doctrine of "state of necessity ." The International Law
Commission has characterized this doctrine as a "circumstance precluding
wrongfulness," that is, a circumstance that prevents what would
otherwise have been an internationally wrongful act from being regarded
as wrongful. A "state of necessity" is described by the Commission as "a
situation of a State whose sole means of safeguarding an essential interest
threatened by a grave and imminent peril is to adopt conduct not in
conformity with what is required of it by an international obligation to
another State." 89 Once again, in order to invoke this doctrine the United
States would have to admit, in effect, that the diversions of Rio Grande
waters would otherwise be unlawful. But in order to invoke the doctrine,
the United States would have to establish that one of its "essential
interests" was "threatened by a grave and imminent peril", something
that the facts would not support. In addition , even if a "state of necessity" were found to exist, the fact that the wrongfulness of the United
States' acts was precluded would not mean the United States would not
be obliged to compensate Mexico for any harm caused. 90

88. Id. at 179-81.
89. [1980] Y.B. Int'I L. Comm'n, vol. 2, pt . 2, p. 34 (para. 1 of commentary to art. 33,
"State of Necessity", of Part One of the ILC's draft articles on State Responsibility).
90. In this connection , see article 35 of Part One of the ILC's draft articles on State
Responsibility, "Reservation as to Compensation for Damage ." Id. at 61.
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any visitor to the locality, where can be witnessed the dying
fruit trees and vines, the abandoned fields, and dry canals for
the greatest portion that has heretofore been cultivated; and
while we are considering the equitable rights of Mexico, this
is also true of the United States side, where almost the same
abandonment and destruction of former prosperous farms may
be witnessed .101
Thus the Commissioners' joint report in effect validated the repeated
protests that had been lodged by the Mexican Minister in Washington.102The investigations disclosed "an increase of 454 [diversion)
canals and of 196,000 acres irrigated in the State of Colorado and
Territory of New Mexico" since 1880.103 While the report was not a
legal opinion per se, its dramatic factual findings highlighted the equity
of Mexico's position. Further, the findings stressed that the American
diversions effectively deprived Mexico of access to one-half of the flow
of the Rio Grande as of the conclusion of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo in 1848. It should be emphasized that the report was fully
concurred in by the American commissioner.
The report made two principal recommendations: that a storage
dam be constructed at El Paso; and that a treaty be concluded to provide for
the distribution of Rio Grande waters . On the first point the report
concluded that the "legal and equitable rights and interests" of each
country and its inhabitants to Rio Grande water could be ensured only by
constructing a dam at El Paso to impound Rio Grande flood waters. 104 It
found that the river's flow was insufficient to support dams at both El Paso
and Elephant Butte,105 and called upon the United States to "in some way

101. Id. at 268.
102. The report concluded that
the flow of the river at El Paso has now been decreased by the taking of
water for irrigation by canals constructed in the United States of America,
about 1,000 second-feet for 100 days annually , equal to 200,000 acre-feet of
water. It will be observed that this loss is distributed through the summer
flow, which at best was not always sufficient before the diminution took
place during dry seasons. Id. at 267.
103. Id. at 265.
104. The report observes that
the great mass of [Rio Grande] waters, both before the construction of the
canals [in the United States) and since, consists of flood waters carried
down the river unused , being utterly unavailable without large reservoirs
to hold it for the season of irrigation, the maximum flow lasting but a few
days.
Id. at 267. The dam recommended would also "prevent the erosions and av ulsions which
have heretofore rendered the boundary line between the two countries so uncertain,
unstable, and vexatious ." Id. at 269.
105. Id. at 267. According to the report, the flow would be sufficient for a dam at Ele-
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prevent the construction of any large reservoirs" in New Mexico; this was
a indirect reference to the proposed Elephant Butte project, discussed
above. 106 The Commissioners' second recommendation was that all
questions concerning the distribution of Rio Grande waters be settled in a
treaty that would provide for those waters to be divided equally between
the two countries by means of a dam to be constructed at El Paso. 107 The
Commissioners further recommended that the United States bear all
expenses associated with the construction of the dam, 108 in exchange for
which Mexico would "relinquish all claims for indemnity for the unlawful
use of waters in the past, and accept the dam so constructed as an equitable
distribution, past and future ... .11109
While an agreement along the lines of that proposed by the
Commission was acceptable to Mexico,110 Secretary Olney indicated to
Minister Romero that the State Department, "in preparing to enter into
negotiations, .. . found the subject embarrassed by greatly perplexing
complications arising out of reservoir dams , etc., either already built or
authorized through the concurrent action of the Federal and State
authorities." 111 According to the Secretary of State, these problems
would have to be "disposed of" before the United States would be in a
position to negotiate. 112 Part of the history of the government's subsequent efforts to "dispose" of the problems has been discussed above .113
As indicated there, after writing the Mexican Minister, the Secretary of
State requested that the Secretary of the Interior look into whether there
were any legal means to cancel rights granted to the private companies.
He later asked the Secretary of War whether a permit would be necessary
for the construction of a dam at Elephant Butte, and if so, whether one
had been granted. As it turned out, a permit had indeed been issued to
the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co.-by the Secretary of the Interior,

phant Butte as well as El Paso only if the company constructing the former were
prevented from appropriating the quantity of water already utilized by inhabitants of the
El Paso valley, in both Mexico and the United States. Id.
106. Id. at 270.
107. Id. at 270-271.
108. The total cost of the dam was estimated at$2,317 ,113.36. Id. at 270. This amount w as
far short of the $35,685,000 Mexico claimed to have suffered in loss of publi c and private
wealth due to American diversions. Letter from Minister Romero to Secretary Olney (5 Jan.
1897), reprinted in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 284.
109. Id. at 271.
110. Letter from Minister Romero to Secretary Olney (Dec . 19, 1896), reprinted in U.S.
Appendix, supra note 4, at 280.
111. Letter from Secretary Olney to Minister Romero (Jan. 4, 1897), reprinted in U.S.
Appendix, supra note 4, at 283.
112. Id.
113. See notes 57-73, supra and accompanying text.
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on February 1, 1895.114 However, the Department of Justice concluded
in April, 1897, that "the Secretary of the Interior had no power ... to
grant the rights claimed," and that the company had not received the
requisite permission from the Secretary of War.115 This permission was
required because of a finding by the Secretary of War that '"the Rio
Grande from a point above Elephant Buttes down is a navigable water of
the United States" 116-a finding that was not disputed by then Attorney
General McKenna but must have come as something of a surprise to the
company since former Attorney General Harmon had concluded precisely
the contrary only two years earlier. The Secretary of War also found that
the proposed dam "will check the flow of the water in the river at
Elephant Butte entirely for a great portion, if not all, of the year and
impound it, and also distribute it from that point for purposes of
irrigation, so that the Rio Grande will be practically destroyed as a stream
for many miles below Elephant Butte .... " 117
The U.S. government therefore sued the Company and its British
affiliaten8 to prevent it from constructing a dam at Elephant Butte on

114. Letter from Secretary of the Interior Francis to Secretary of State Olney (19 Dec.
1896),reprintedin U.S. Appendix,supra note 4, at 277.
115. Letter from the Solicitor General to the Secretary of War, reprintedin U.S. Appendix,
supra note 4, at 319, 323.
116. Letter from Secretary Sherman to the Mexican Minister (May 12. 1897), printed in
U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 335, referring to finding of the Secretary of War mentioned
in the letter from the Secretary of War to the Attorney General (Feb. 19, 1897),printedin U.S.
Appendix, supra note 4, at 313,314. This finding was apparently based at least in part on the
fact that "from El Paso up to and including the site of the proposed dam, and a good many
miles beyond that point, it [the Rio Grande) has been used to float logs for commercial and
busmess purposes.ff Id. The Secretary of the Interior had given the original authori2:ation on
the basis of the act of March 3, 1891, which provided for
the location and selection of reservoir sites on the public lands of the
United States and rights of way for irrigating ditches and canals. There is
nothing in the act or its purposes which was intended to affect the control
or supervision of the navigable rivers of the country. That by other ...
legislation is put in the Secretary of War.
Letter from the Solicitor General to the Secretary of War (Apr. 24,1897), printed in U.S.
Appendix,supra note 4, at 319, 321.
In other words , if the project would affect navigation, only the Secretary of War was
competent to issue a permit. As noted, the Secretary of War found that the stretch of the Rio
Grande in question was navigable, thereby making himself competent.
117. Letter from the Secretary of War to the Attorney General (Feb. 19, 1897),printed in
U.S. Appendix,supra note 4, at 313, 314.
118. Suit was brought in the U.S. District court of the Third Judicial District of the
Territory of New Mexico. Set United States v. The Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Company,
9 N.M. 292, 51 P. 674 (1898)(order granting temporary injunction May 18970, in U.S.
Appendix, supra note 4, at 1; United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S.
690 (1899). The government amended its complaint to add the Rio Grande Irrigation and
Land Company, Limited, as an additional defendant. While the Rio Grande Dam and
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referred to in the passage quoted above. Secretary of State Elihu Root
described the purpose of the dam as follows:
It is .. . in accordance not only with the plans initiated by the

United States Government for the reclamation of the arid land
of the West, but in pursuance of the obligations incurred
through a conventional arrangement with the Republic of
Mexico, that the United States Reclamation Service is making
the preliminary surveys looking toward the erection of an
International Dam across the Rio Grande, near Engle, New
Mexico.125
The "conventional arrangement'' was the 1906 treaty between the two
countries, discussed below . The 1905 Act, however, made no mention of
Mexico or obligations to that country. According to the British memorial
in the arbitration discussed above, the U.S. government's dam was
"virtually in all essential respects . . . the same Elephant Butte Dam
project that the [private] Companies had planned to carry out ... ,"
except that the U.S. constructed "a higher storage dam" than the
companies' plans had called for.126
That the United States would, on its own initiative, undertake to
construct a dam in New Mexico so similar to the private project that
seemed to have been an obstacle to resolving the dispute, a project that
the United States fought so hard to stop, must have been both confusing
and alarming to the Mexican government. Such a reaction by Mexico
would have been especially understandable in view of the recommendation in the Commissioners' report of a site that was much further
downstream, at El Paso, and that would be under the joint control of the
two countries. Indeed, a note from the Mexican Ambassador to the
Acting Secretary of State of April 26, 1905, as much as expressed these
sentiments. The note referred to the 1905 statute authorizing the Engle
Dam, noting that this statute "differs from its predecessors relative to this
same subject of an international dam, in which mention was always made
of Mexico and Mexican rights, but in this act not a word is said [thereof]

United States was steadily engaged in carrying out the said Elephant Butte [Engle Dam]
Project as a Government project." BritishMemorial, supra note 69, at 24-25.
125. Memorandum of Elihu Root, Secretary of State, to the British Government, as
quoted in BritishMemorial,supra note 69, at 30, 31.
126. BritishMemorial,supranote 69, at 25. The memorial quotes from a speech by Senator
Charles S. Thomas in the U.S. Senate in which the senator stated: "It is remarkable that a
dam constructed by private enterprise should be an obstruction to navigation, while the
same dam constructed by Government enterprise should not obstruct or interfere with such
navigation ." Id.
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The note went on to state that Mexico was anticipating "recompense" for the harm it had suffered. That harm had been assessed in a
note of June, 1904, from the Mexican Ambassador to the Secretary of
State as having doubled since Minister Romero had made his estimate of
$35.6 million eight years earlier, putting the total at over $70 million .128
The State Department responded promptly , on May 1, to Mexico's
note of 26 April. 129 Referring to "the question of any legal liability on
the part of the United States to the Government of Mexico" for depriving
Mexico of water through diversions in Colorado and New Mexico, the
Acting Secretary of State declared that "the [State] Department is unable
to find any grounds in international law upon which such liability could
be based." 130 "Nevertheless," the note continued, "the Government of
the United States is disposed to govern its action in the premises in
accordance with the high principles of equity and with the friendly
sentiments which should exist between good neighbors." 131 The Acting
Secretary went on to inform the Mexican Ambassador that the State
Department was in the process of preparing a draft treaty "with a view
to reaching an agreement . . . which shall adjust the question in accordance with the high principles of equity and comity which happily
govern the relations between the United States and Mexico." 132 He then
offered the following explanation of the Engle Dam project :
••••

"

Having in view the foregoing, the Executive is taking steps
looking towards the construction of a dam on the Rio Grande
at Engle, N. Mex., in accordance with the act of Congress of
February 25, (1905). In the opinion of the department, proceed ing with this work will not stand in the way of, but will rather
hasten, the satisfactory solution of the whole question between
the two governments .133
Thus, the U.S. government once again denied any legal liability yet
demonstrated that it was willing to go to great lengths to resolve the
dispute .

127. Letter from F. Gamboa , ChargJ d ' Affaires, to A. Adee , Acting Secreta ry of State (26
Apr. 1905), printed in U.S. Appendix,supra note 4, at 501.
128. Letter from Ambassador M. de Azpi roz to Secretary of State John Hay Oune 3,
1904), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 485, 486.
129. Letter from Acting Secretary Adee to ChargJ d' Affaires ad inttrim F. Gamboa (1 May
1905) printed in U.S. Apptndix, supra note 4, at 502 .
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 503. The note also in dica ted that steps were being taken to draft a treaty
for submwion to Mexico conce.rning the Co lorado River controversy between the two
countries.
133. Id. at 503.
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Mexico responded by note of August 11134 which referred to
legal authorities supporting liability of the United States, including the
opinions of two Mexican jurists and citations to an American work upon
which the Mexican authors based their positions .135 The American
study, by H.P. Farnham, stated in relevant part as follows:
A river which flows through the territory of several states or
nations is their common property . . . . It is a great natural
highway conferring, besides the facilities of navigation, certain
incidental advantages, such as fishery and the right to use the
water for power and irrigation. Neither nation can do any act
which will deprive the other of the benefits of those rights and
advantages. The inherent right of a nation to protect itself and
its territory would justify the one lower down the stream in
preventing by force the one further up from turning the river
out of its course, or in consuming so much of the water for
p~
of its own as to deprive the former of its benefit .. . .136
Thus Farnham relied on a principle closely akin to that of
self-preservation to support a conclusion that is the precise opposite of
what Attorney General Harmon had derived from the same principle .
It should be emphasized at this point that the fact that Harmon
and Farnham could derive diametrically opposed conclusions from the
same general principle demonstrates the lack of utility of principles that
allow a country to take virtually any action in the name of protecting
itself against a peril that, according to its unilateral determination,
confronts it.
The Mexican note concluded by stressing that country's ''best
disposition to bring an end to [the) question .... " 137 Secretary of State
Elihu Root replied on December 19, 1905, that the United States was
unable to accept the soundness of the Mexican legal position .138 Secretary Root explained that since the opinions of the two Mexican authors
had been based upon the American work , and since that work had cited
no decision or text in support of its conclusion , inquiry had been made
of the American author as to the basis of his position . Root reported that

134. Letter from F. Gamboa , ChargJ d' Affaires ad interim,to Elihu Root, Secretary of State
printed in U.S. Appendix,supra note 4, at 503.
135 . Id. at 504, citing 1 FARNHAM, LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, 29, 63 (1904). Mr.
Gamboa's note of August 11, 1905, after referring to "the doctrine set up by H.P. Farnham ,"
stated that "on that doctrine rest the opinions of the two Mexican jurists above named ."
136. 1 H. P. Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights 29 (1904)
137. Letter from ChargJ d ' Affaires ad interim Gamboa to Secretary of State Root,
Secretary of State (Aug . 11, 1905), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 5, at 505.
138. Letter from Secretary Root to Joaquin D. Casasus, Mexican Ambassador (Dec. 19,
1905), printed in U.S. Appendix, supra note 4, at 517.
(11 Aug. 1905),
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and tenaciously pursue protracted litigation to halt a private dam project
in order to be certain it could control the quantity of water delivered to
Mexico. And it was so important that the United States would agree to
pay the considerable costs of guaranteeing Mexico its share. The great
lengths to which the United States was willing to go to in fulfillment of
its "moral obligation" 155 to provide Mexico with a fair share of Rio
Grande waters suggest that regardless of its formal reliance on the
Harmon Doctrine it did not consider itself free to exhaust the flow of the
Rio Grande before it reached Mexico. This conclusion is reinforced by the
practice of the United States in other cases .
III. THE "HARMON DOCTRINE" IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER
UNITED ST ATES PRACTICE
In a number of instances the United States has taken positions
inconsistent with the Harmon Doctrine . The arguments of the United
States in these cases tend to reinforce the conclusion that the Hannon
Doctrine represented advocacy in a particular case rather than a
statement of what the United States objectively regarded as a principle of
international law . We may begin this survey some eight months before
Attorney Gener al Harmon 's opinion was issued, when the United States
requested of Great Britain that "suitable measures . . . be taken to avert
the threatened injury " from a dam, or "dyke ", which a corporation of the
Canadian Province of British Columbia planned to construct on Boundary
Creek "where it crosses the boundary line, the result of which would be
the overflow and washing away of the lands and improvement of settlers
in the [U.S.) State of Idaho." 156 In the event, work on the dam proceeded, resulting in the apprehended injuries , whereupon the United States
requested prompt "removal of the obstruction in the creek, and the
paymen t of proper indemnity to those who had been injured . . . .'' 157
This case demonstrates that the United States, at least with regard to
flooding, was not prepared to admit that a state was completely free to
dispose of the portion of an international watercourse within its borders .
Indeed , even Attorney General Harmon's opinion itself technically does not deny that there is a duty on the part of one State to avoid
causing injury to another State by means of actions wholly within the
territo ry of the first State. This point-that a state's sovereignty over its
rivers does not give it license to harm other states-was made by an
American negotiator of the 1909 treaty concerning boundary waters

155. Seenote 99, and accompanying text.
156. Question as to Running Water, 2 Moore DIGEST§226 at 451-452.
157. Id. at 451.
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Attorney General Harmon 's opinion was a correct statement of the law
as practiced by the United States . Three exec.utive branch officials
challenged this assertion. First, an Assistant Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, after pointing out that the Harmon opinion was
based primarily on language from the SchoonerExchangecase, which did
not involve the question of the allocation of waters of international rivers,
stated as follows:
(T]he contention that . .. The United States can properly refuse
to arbitrate a demand by Mexico for additional waters of the
Colorado is, to say the least, extremely doubtful , particularly
when the Harmon opinion is viewed in the light of the
following:
(a) The practice of states as evidenced by treaties
between various countries, including the United
States, providing for the equitable apportionment of
waters of international rivers.
(b) The decisions of domestic courts giving effect to
the doctrine of equitable apportionment, and
rejecting, as between the States, the Harmon doctrine.
(c) The writing of authorities on international law
in opposit ion to the Harmon doctrine .
(d) The Trail Smelter Arbitration .. .. 171
Second, then Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the
following statement on the point under consideration:
The logical conclusion of the legal argument of the opponents
of the treaty appears to be that an upstream nation by unilateral act in its own territory can impinge upon the rights of a
downstream nation; this is hardly the kind of legal doctrine
that can be seriously urged in these times. 172
And finally, Mr. Frank Clayton, counsel for the United States section of
the International Boundary Commission, stated :
Attorney General Harmon's opinion has never been followed
either by the United States or by any other country of which
I am aware . .. . I have made an attempt to digest the interna tional treaties on this subject ... . [I]n all those I have been
able to find, the starting point seemed to be the protection of
the existing uses in both the upper riparian country and the

171. Trtaty with MexicoRelating to Utilization of Waters of CertainRiwrs: Hearingsbefort
the Senate Committeeon Foreign Relations. 79th Cong ., 1st Sess. 1751 (1945) (Testimony of
Mr. Ben M . English, Assistant Legal Adviser of the Department of State).
tn . Id. at 1762.
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lower riparian country, without regard to asserting the
doctrine of exclusive territorial sovereignty. Most of them
endeavor to go further than that and to make provision for
expansion in both countries, both upper and lower, within the
limits of the available supply. 173
A fitting postscript to the conclusion of the 1944 treaty was provided by
Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who observed, upon the
treaty's approval by the U.S. Senate, that it would allow Mexico and the
United States to "cooperate as good neighbors in developing the vital
water resources of the rivers in which each has an equitable interest." 174
In a dispute a few years later between the United States and
Canada over the Columbia River,175 the position of the United States
was reversed . Here it was a downstream state, at the mercy of the
upstream state but for any constraints imposed on the latter by international law . The dispute was ultimately resolved by the 1961 Columbia
River Basin Treaty, 176 an agreement which one commentator characterized as having "ended one of the bitterest debates ever waged between
Canada and the United States ." 177 The Columbia rises in the Columbia
Ice Field in British Columbia, Canada, flows across the U.S.-Canadian
border into the state of Washington and empties into the Pacific Ocean
at the border between the states of Washington and Oregon . It is joined
in Canada by the Kootenay River, which originates in Canada then flows
into the United States before returning to Canada and merging with the
Columbia .

173. Id. at 97-98.
174. 12 DEP'TST. BULL.742 (1945). The President of the United States made the following
statement concerning the approval by the Senate of the 1944 treaty:
In voting its approval of the water treaty with Mexico, the Senate today
gave unmistakable evidence that it stands firmly in support of the
established policy of our Government to deal with our good neighbors on
the basis of simple justice, equity , friendly understanding, and practical
cooperation. By this action of the Senate , the United States and Mexico join
hands in a constructive , businesslike program to apportion between them
and develop to their mutual advantage the waters of the rivers that are in
part common to them.
Id.
175. Set generallyParticular Rivers: Columbia , 3 Whiteman DIGEST§15, at 978 (1964);
Ralph Johnson, The Columbia Basin, in INTERNATIONAL
DRAINAGEBASINS
, supra note 5,
at 167; L. BLOOMFIELD&:
G. FITZGERALD
, BoUNDARYWATERSPROBLEMS
OF CANADAAND
rnE UNITEDSTATES46 (1958); Charles Bourne, TheColumbiaRiver Controversy, 37 CAN.
BARREv.444 (1959). The dispute was the subject of a reference to the International Joint
&:FITZGERALD
, supra at 164
Commission, United States and Canada . Set BLOOMFIELD
(summary of Docket No . 51).
176. Treaty relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resourc es of the
Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961, U.S.-Can ., 15 U.S.T. 1555.
177. Johnson, supra note 175, at 167.
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watercourses. If it had considered this to be the applicable rule, one
would have expected its behavior, and its expectations of Mexico, to have
conformed to a reasonable degree with the Doctrine's precepts. But rather
than acting on the basis of Harmon's advice, the United States acceded
to Mexico's demands and entered into an agreement that apportioned the
waters in what the agreement described as an equitable manner. And
perhaps even more tellingly, far from following the Doctrine by allowing
its citizens free rein to divert Rio Grande waters, the United States
government sued those citizens, among others, to prevent them from
depriving Mexico of its fair share of Rio Grande waters. Indeed,
Harmon's opinion stands out as an anomaly-albeit
a rather dramatic
one-when viewed in the context not only of the United States' conduct
in the dispute, but also of other statements by the United States
government itself. Arrayed against a solitary opinion of an Attorney
General are a joint resolution of Congress, a statement of the President,
and numerous conciliatory statements by State Department officials, all
seeking to apportion Rio Grande waters fairly with Mexico .
And third, the practice of the United States in disputes subsequent to the Rio Grande controversy--even those (such as the controversies over the Colorado and Rio Grande leading to the 1944 treaty) in
which the United States was in an upstream position-demonstrate
that
the United States has gone to great lengths to repudiate the Doctrine, and
has even maintained that it never represented the law.
It might be thought that in the Rio Grande controversy the
United States was in fact motivated principally by a desire to ensure that
its citizens in upstream states (Colorado and New Mexico) did not
deprive its citizens in downstream states (New Mexico and Texas) of Rio
Grande water; and that Mexico was merely an incidental beneficiary of
the U.S. government's efforts in this regard. Such a theory is not
supported on the record, however. Perhaps curiously, there are very few
references to American citizens in downstream states in the documents
of the era concerning whether diversions in Colorado and New Mexico
should be allowed to continue unchecked . But it is even more revealing
that the private Elephant Butte dam project was halted not at the instance
of the Bureau of Reclamation or any other agency concerned with
domestic water supply, but at the instance of the Department of State.
This strongly suggests that the United States government's chief concern
was in fact being able to guaranty a sufficient flow of Rio Grande water
for Mexico.
The question of exactly what Attorney General Harmon said in
his opinion has also been the subject of close scrutiny. As one commentator has observed, the Harmon Doctrine itself is not necessarily a
statement of the law of international watercourses but "an assertion that,
there being no rules of international law which governed, states were free
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to do as they wished." 187 And as a State Department memorandum has
pointed out, "the truism that a state is sovereign in its territory does not
lead to the conclusion that a state may legally make unlimited use of
waters within its territory." 188 Since there are in fact two sovereignties
involved-that of the downstream state as well as that of the upstream
state-states
riparian to an international watercourse operate under
reciprocal constraints. 189 Moreover, while Harmon emphasized the
complete freedom of a state as to portions of international watercourses
situated within its territory, he did not deny-and
in fact recognized-that there was a duty to refrain from harming other states.
In his influential work on international watercourses, Herbert
Smith comments upon Harmon's view that the case was one of first
impression: "Although authority in 1895 was not plentiful, the problem
was not ... entirely a novel one, and indeed Mr. Harmon's vague
reference to 'precedents' seems inconsistent with the suggestion of
novelty." 190 Smith goes on to remark that: "The opinion clearly rests
upon an insufficient analysis both of principles and of practice ... ,'' 191
and concludes that "Mr. Harmon's attitude seems to have been merely
the caution of the ordinary lawyer who is determined not to concede
unnecessarily a single point to the other side." 192
In view of the foregoing examination of the practice of the United
States, this latter statement is probably the most accurate way to
characterize Attorney General Harmon's opinion. The United States did
not follow the "Harmon Doctrine" in the dispute that gave birth to it, nor
has it acted in accordance with the Doctrine in subsequent controversies
187. Lipper, supra note 6, at 22-23.
188. See the GRIFFINMEMORANDUM, supra note 154, at 60-61. Interestingly, this
document was prepared in response to a request by the U.S. Senate for a memorandum
on the international law applicable to Canada's proposed diversions from the Kootenay
River into the Columbia River (which flows into the United States) and from the
Columbia into the Fraser River (which is an entirely Canadian river, emptying into the
Strait of Georgia at Vancover, B.C).
The point made in the quotation was also recogni zed in a 1952 United Nations study:
Each riparian State has a right of ownership over the section of the
waterway which traverses it, and this right restricts the freedom of
action of the others. Nevertheless, the fact that each State is obliged to
respect the right of ownership of the other States in no way impairs its
sovereign power.
U.N. EcONOMIC COMM' N ON EUROPE, LEGAL AsPECTS OF THE HYDRO-ELECTRIC DEVELOP(1952).
MENT OF RIVERS AND LAKES OF COMMON INTERFST 209, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/136
189. See the statement of Chandler P. Anderson in text accompanying note 160, supra
and accompanying text.
190. Herbert Arthur Smith, The Economi c Uses of International Rivers 42 (1931).

191. Id.
192. Id. at 145.
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concerning international watercourses. States do not, and cannot, exist in
isolation. This is all the more true with regard to their use of shared
water resources, as the government officials quoted above have recognized. On the basis of policy as well as practice, therefore, the "Harmon
Doctrine" of absolute territorial sovereignty should, one hundred years
after it was enunciated, be laid to a richly-deserved rest.

